We investigate the dimensionality of political conflict in the European Parliament by applying scaling method techniques to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 in the European Parliament. Contrary to most existing studies using scaling methods, we are able to interpret the substantive content of the observed dimensions using exogenous measures of national party policy positions. We find that the main dimension of politics in the EU's only elected institution is the classic left-right dimension found in domestic politics. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent, which is explained by conflicts between the parties in 'government' in the EU Council and Commission and the parties in 'opposition' in the Parliament.
Introduction
In less than twenty years the European Parliament has evolved from a consultative body into the most powerful inter-state assembly in history. The European Parliament now has equal legislative power with the governments in many key areas, can amend many lines in the European Union (EU) budget, can veto the governments' nominee for Commission President, and can sack the Commission. Also, further European Parliament powers -such as allowing the parliament to elect the Commission and amend all legislation and budget lines -have been key issues in the debate over the EU Constitution. Nevertheless, outside a small group of experts, the only directly elected European body remains relatively unknown. Understanding politics inside the European Parliament is thus increasingly vital for understanding politics in the EU.
Politics in the EU is different from traditional national politics in democratic countries for several reasons. First, the EU is still more a supranational institution than a federal state.
Second, there is considerable heterogeneity between the cultures, histories, economic conditions and national institutions of member states. Therefore, politics in the EU is likely to be more complex and multi-dimensional than national politics. Understanding the dimensionality of politics in the European Parliament should thus be an important step forward in understanding both the politics of the EU as well as how politics in other inter-state assemblies may develop. 1 One of the main ways of understanding politics inside legislative institutions is to investigate the shape of the policy space. The number of policy dimensions and the location of actors on these dimensions determine inter alia which actors are pivotal, the size of the winset, and hence the possibility and direction of policy change (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002) . Not surprisingly, a fast growing area of political science research in recent years has been the estimation of actors' ideal points. This has taken a variety of forms and methods, such as scaling of roll-call voting data (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997 Heckman and Snyder, 1997; Poole, 2000) , hand coding of party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001) , surveys of experts' opinions of parties' positions (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995) , or computer coding of political statements (Laver, 2001; Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003) . The collection and dissemination of these spatial data has transformed several areas of political science and given them a stronger scientific empirical content.
The European Parliament is an especially interesting object of analysis because of its unique features. The European legislators are members of national parties but also of European party groups. Moreover, electoral districts do not transcend national borders, which means that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also represent their country. A legislature with such characteristics is potentially one with high dimensionality.
A first dimension that comes to mind is the support or opposition to further European integration, a topic that has been the focus of an important part of the literature on the EU (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Marks and Steenbergen, 2002) . In this interpretation of EU politics, actors prefer 'more' or 'less' European integration: with states like the Benelux and the supranational institutions (the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice) closer to the 'pro-Europe' end of the dimension, and the United Kingdom and Denmark closer to the 'anti-Europe' end. The European Parliament is generally seen as a unitary actor at the pro-European end of this dimension. However, given that national politicians and national parties are represented in the European Parliament, the EU integration dimension might also play an important role within the European Parliament.
However, in recent research it has been argued that as the EU increasingly makes policies in traditional areas of domestic politics -such as market regulation, social and environmental policies, and justice and interior affairs -we should expect a 'left-right' dimension to emerge in EU politics. There is dispute, however, as to whether this new dimension will remain orthogonal to (Hix, 1999) , merge with (Hooghe and Marks, 1999) , or replace (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000) the traditional pro-/anti-integration conflict.
The existence of these two underlying dimensions of EU politics has been confirmed at the empirical level, in the positions national parties take on Europe (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2001; Aspinwall, 2002) , in the European party federations' election manifestos (Hix, 1999; Gabel and Hix, 2002) , and in mass attitudes towards the EU (Gabel and Anderson, 2002) . These two dimensions have also been observed in initial research on the policy space inside the European Parliament (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002) and the EU Council (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Mattila, 2004) . However, the existing research on the European Parliament has not investigated the full history of voting in the parliament since the first direct elections in 1979.
As a result, any change in the number and content of dimensions over time has remained undocumented. Indeed, the European Parliament is an evolving legislative institution.
Consequently, one may expect at least some variation in the number and content of dimensions over time. In addition, the existing studies have not used exogenous measures to interpret the substantive content of the dimensions and the relative locations of the actors on these dimensions.
Without a clear understanding of conflicts inside the European Parliament, most theoretical models of EU policy-making prefer to treat the European Parliament as a unitary actor (e.g. Tsebelis, 1994; Crombez, 1997) ,
We consequently describe the policy space inside the European Parliament by applying an established scaling method, Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE algorithm, to all roll-call votes between 1979 and 2001 -over 12 ,000 votes by more than 2,000 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) . This method provides not only a measure of the dimensionality of the policy space, but also ideal point estimates on each policy dimension for every MEP since 1979. One weakness of this and similar inductive scaling methods is that the identification of the substantive meaning of the dimensions requires post hoc subjective expert interpretation. This is usually done by mapping vote divisions to find issues with cutting lines that are orthogonal to the dimension of interest. Unfortunately, one cannot rely on existing statistical techniques to confirm these heuristic interpretations. In this paper we seek to overcome this weakness of inductive We find one main dimension of politics in the European Parliament. This dimension is the classic left-right dimension of domestic party politics in Europe. A second dimension is also present, although to a lesser extent. This dimension can be interpreted as the pro-and antiintegration dimension. But, closer analysis reveals that the second dimension also captures interinstitutional conflicts between the party groups and national parties in the parliament and the parties in 'government' in the EU Council and Commission. In other words, governmentopposition conflicts at the European level are reflected in the European Parliament.
2 Our analysis is robust to the use of other scaling methods. We use another scaling method, Poole's Optimal Classification to check how sensitive our results are to using NOMINATE. We find very strong correlation between the ideal point estimates produced by both methods. Moreover, our regression results come out even stronger when using the Optimal Classification method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides some background information on the European Parliament. Section three presents the results of the NOMINATE algorithm for the five elected parliaments since 1979. Section four presents the substantive interpretation of the dimensions revealed by NOMINATE, using regression analysis. Section five concludes.
Parties and Politics in the European Parliament
Existing research on the European Parliament suggests that national parties are the primary principals of the Members of the European Parliament (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Kreppel, 2001; Hix, 2002 Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998) . Nevertheless, transnational parties in the European Parliament help national parties and
MEPs structure their behavior in much the same way as parties do in the US Congress (cf. Cox and McCubbins, 1993, and Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1997) . Each national party is unlikely to obtain its policy objectives by acting alone. National parties could negotiate coalitions vote-byvote. However, this would be costly in terms of time, and hard to enforce. As a result, national parties who expect to have similar preferences on a range of future policy issues can reduce the transactions costs of coalition-formation by establishing a transnational party organization. This party organization constitutes a division-of-labor contract: where 'backbench' MEPs provide labor and capital (working out the position of the party and gathering information on the issues on which they become specialized), and party group 'leaders' distribute committee and party offices, communicate party positions and enforce the terms of the party organization contract. First, the fact that most national parties have decided to join transnational party groups suggests that these aggregate agents expect that on most issues on the EU agenda their policy preferences will be closer to parties from the same party family from other member states than to parties from a different party family from their own member state. For example, the French and Swedish Socialists expect to be closer on most issues than they will be to the French and Swedish Conservatives, respectively. If the opposite were the case, the French Socialists would have an incentive to form a transnational party organization with the French Conservatives, and likewise for the Swedish Socialists and Conservatives.
In other words, the predominance of party-based rather than national-based groups in the European Parliament suggests that the main observable dimension of conflict in the European Parliament should correlate with the dimension that distinguishes the European party families from each other in domestic politics: the left-right dimension, in its socio-economic (interventionfree market) as well as socio-political (liberty-authority) versions.
Second, national parties who established their own party groups expect that their policy positions will be sufficiently different from any of the transnational party groups to make it too costly to join any of these organizations. Hence, despite the expected dominance of party-family based divisions, at least some national parties in the European Parliament expect issues to split representatives along national rather than transnational lines.
So, the existence of some non-transnational groups in the history of the European Parliament, and the fact that national political parties remain the primary principals for the MEPs, suggests that we should also observe 'national' conflicts on issues which are salient to particular member states, when some of the parties from these states can be expected to vote together rather than to follow the instructions of their transnational parties.
Existing studies of roll-call voting in the European Parliament find that the transnational party groups are less cohesive than their cousins in domestic parliaments in Europe, but that the MEPs are more likely to vote along transnational party lines than national lines (Attinà, 1990; Brzinski, 1995; Raunio, 1997; and Hix and Lord, 1997) . Also, existing applications of scaling methods to voting in the European parliament suggest that the main dimension of conflict is the left-right (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002; Noury and Roland, 2002) .
However, these results are derived from samples of votes in particular periods and there are no studies of the evolution of the conflicts and the relative location of parties and MEPs over time.
It is also worth mentioning the place of the European Parliament in the EU's legislative process. The European Commission has exclusive rights to initiate legislative proposals.
However, given the very high voting hurdle in the Council (unanimity or a qualified-majority), the Commission rarely initiates proposals that are not expected to win approval in the Council (Tsebelis, 1994 (Tsebelis, , 2002 . The role of the European Parliament has usually been more passive than that of the Council. The European Parliament has a lower voting hurdle (mostly simple majority) and its role was mostly consultative in the early years. The European Parliament therefore had no real agenda-setting powers. However, the extension of co-decision powers has given the Parliament increased powers to shape the content of legislation.
Establishing the Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament
There are three types of votes in the European Parliament. The first two types are the 'show of hands vote' and the 'electronic vote'. In both these types, how each MEP votes is not recorded.
In NOMINATE then assumes that legislator i has a utility function over outcome y on vote j of
where u ijy is the deterministic portion of the utility function and ijy is the stochastic (idiosyncratic or error) portion, and the d ijy term is the Euclidean distance between x i and z jy . The coefficient , is a constant, which acts as a signal-to-noise ratio -as increases, the deterministic element of the function increases relative to the stochastic element, and 'perfect' spatial voting results, and as decreases, voting becomes more random. The utility of outcome n on vote j is defined simply by substituting n for y where z jn is defined accordingly. The stochastic term ijy , is assumed to have an extreme value distribution.
This allows the probability that a legislator votes Yes or No on a particular issue to be computed using the standard logit arithmetic. The constructed likelihood function is then maximized to obtain the parameters of the model: the dimensions of the political space, the ideal point of each legislator in this space, and the location of the 'cutting line' of each vote.
This method has been applied with great success to the U.S. Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) , and has recently begun to be applied to other voting environments with multiple players and multiple decisions, such as the United Nations (Voeten, 2000) and other parliaments (e.g. Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003) . These maps also confirm the two main trends in voting behavior in the European Parliament since 1979 revealed using other methods (e.g. Hix et al., 2004) . First, all the party groups have become more cohesive, as illustrated by the declining dispersion of the positions of the MEPs in each party group across the five parliaments. Second, in terms of the structure of the party system, there is a clear difference between the first three parliaments and the fourth and fifth parliaments. In the first three parliaments, the party system was split into two blocs: a left bloc (of Socialists, Radical Left and Greens), against a right bloc (of the European People's Party, Liberals, French Gaullists and allies, and British Conservatives and allies). However, the fourth and fifth parliaments reveal a different party system. In this new system, the Liberals occupy a position between the Socialists and EPP.
Note that these three groups voted as much with each other as with the smaller groups on the left and right. Put another way, from 1994, the three main party groups (Socialists, EPP and Liberals) emerged as the main 'coalition' inside the European Parliament. Against this coalition are two 'opposition' blocs: on the left, the Greens, Radical Left and the left-wing members of the anti-European group; and on the right, the non-EPP Conservatives, the British Conservatives within the EPP group, the right wing anti-Europeans, and the various Radical Right MEPs (in the non-attached group) (see Hix et al., 2004 for an analysis of coalition formation in the European Parliament over time).
These figures consequently reveal the emergence of clearly distinct party families and alliances at the EU level.
In the next section we analyze the content of the dimensions in more detail. Table 3 shows the correlations between the positions on the two dimensions of the individual MEPs who served in consecutive parliaments. What we observe is that correlations are very high for the first dimension and somewhat lower, although still high, for the second dimension. The stability of these dimensions over time suggests that the dimensions capture some substantive aspects of conflict in the European Parliament. Note that the correlation coefficients are higher than Poole and Rosenthal (1997) report for the US Congress. These correlation coefficients are especially high considering that the European Parliament has a five-year term whereas the US Congress has a two-year term. [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] , 73 in the second parliament, 85 in the third, 103 in the fourth, and 119 in the fifth. Consequently, we have 437 observations in the pooled analysis.
Explaining the Dimensions of European politics

Variables
However, in the pooled analysis, we lose a number of observations as a result of missing data on national party policy positions.
We have three types of independent variables. First, as policy variables, we use exogenous measures of national party positions on the left-right axis and on the pro-/anti-Europe axis, testing the expectation that the policy space in the European Parliament combines these two underlying policy dimensions. These measures are fully exogenous and therefore lead us to an independent evaluation which allows us to give a more objective and statistically founded interpretation of the policy dimensions rather than a purely subjective interpretation. We use the measures of left-right and EU policy position produced by the manifestos research group (Budge et al., 2001) . 4 This data has been widely used as an independent assessment of party policy positions across time and space. For our purpose, the party manifesto's data has an advantage over expert judgments of party locations because the manifesto's data has more observations over time. We expect exogenous left-right policy positions to explain national party ideal point estimates on the first dimension, and exogenous pro-/anti-EU policy positions to explain national party ideal point estimates on the second dimension.
Second, to capture the effect of government-opposition dynamics and the national and European levels, we use two dummy measures: (1) whether a national party was in government during the relevant parliament (coded 1 if the national party was in government for a majority of the period and 0 otherwise), and (2) whether a national party had a European Commissioner during the relevant parliament (coded 1 if the national party had a Commissioner for the whole period of the parliament, 0.5 if the national party had a Commissioner for approximately half of the period of the parliament, and 0 otherwise). Table 4 shows some summary statistics for these two variables. Following our theory, we expect these variables to be significant on the second dimension but not on the first. Table A1 in the Appendix.
We first assume that there is no change in the content of the dimensions over time and perform a pooled analysis. The advantage of the pooled analysis is that by having a large number of observations the estimates of the relationships are more precise. In the pooled analysis we introduce dummy variables for each parliament (except the first) as control variables. We then perform parliament by parliament analysis. This allows us to investigate whether the content of the dimensions has changed across parliaments. Table 5 shows the results from the pooled analysis. Third, the left-right variable remains highly significant after the inclusion of party dummies, meaning that left-right policy positions also explain variations in MEP positions on the first dimension within party groups. This cannot be observed from the spatial maps, but is clearly shown in the data. Nevertheless, the massive increase in the size of the R-squared between the first and second models reveals that most variation on this dimension is explained by left-right conflicts between rather than within the party groups.
Results
Fourth, the magnitude of the coefficients on the party group variables on the first dimension confirms the intuition from the spatial figures: with the most left-wing parties having the lowest coefficients and the most right-wing parties having the highest coefficients.
Fifth, country dummies are generally not significant on the first dimension, regardless of the specification. This confirms the view that voting in the European Parliament is not driven by national interest.
Turning to the estimates on the second dimension, EU policy positions are significant without party dummies but not significant at any level with party dummies. This means that variation between party groups on the second dimension is explained by their policies towards EU integration.
Second, the party groups have significant coefficients on the second dimension. The magnitude of these coefficients explains their location on the second dimension: with the most pro-EU party groups having the most positive coefficients, and the most anti-EU party groups having the most negative coefficients. The British Conservatives are the exception, because they were relatively pro-European in the first and second parliaments, when they were a separate party group.
Third, government participation is highly significant on the second dimension in all specifications. This means that competition between national parties on this dimension in the European Parliament is also driven by government-opposition dynamics, from the domestic arena and also from representation of governing parties in the EU Council.
Fourth, having an EU Commissioner is significant on the second dimension once party dummies are excluded from the specification. In other words, the second dimension also captures a government-opposition dynamic between party groups at the European level, where party groups with a number of Commissioners are more likely to be at the pro-EU end of the dimension.
Fifth, member state variables are generally not significant on the second dimension. In other words, member states' MEPs do not have stable positions over time on this dimension, which suggests that the meaning of this dimension as far as member states are concerned may change over time.
The main findings are still valid when we analyze our data parliament by parliament (see Tables A2a-A2e in the Appendix). One exception is that the left-right variable is not significant in the models of the first dimension that include the party dummies for the third and fourth parliaments. In these parliaments the left-right variable cannot explain the within party group positions, mainly because there is more discipline within the EP, driving out the role of domestic policy positions.
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Also, in accordance with the goodness-of-fit statistics reported above, the parliament by parliament results reveal some change in the content of the second dimension between the first two parliaments and the last three parliaments. In the first two parliaments, it is not clear that the second dimension is mainly related to EU policy positions. In the last three parliaments, this is much clearer. There is also a strong correlation to government participation. However, this variable is less significant than in the pooled analysis partly due to the small number of observations in the parliament by parliament analysis.
Robustness Checks
A possible concern with our analysis is our reliance on NOMINATE to scale legislators positions. Although NOMINATE is widely used and applied to various contexts, other scaling methods might deliver different results. Rosenthal and Voten (2004) We also replicate our regression analysis on the results obtained via Optimal Classification. The findings, reported in see tables A4a-A4c, are qualitatively identical to our previous results. The coefficients in the regressions are also remarkably similar to those obtained with NOMINATE. The results on the second dimension come out even somewhat stronger with Optimal Classification. This is clearly the case for the government participation variable in the first four parliaments. It is not our purpose here to discuss which of the two methods is the most appropriate for the European Parliament. Our intention is rather to demonstrate that the analysis of the two main dimensions of politics in the European Parliament is virtually unchanged, whichever of these two scaling methods are used.
Conclusion
The European Note: US House and Senate data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) , UN General Assembly data from Voeten (2000) , French National Assembly data from Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) . Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Dummies for EP2, EP3, EP4 and EP5 are present but not reported. 
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